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Abstract 
By looking beyond the financial characteristics of borrowers, this research brings to light the 
social factors that influence a borrower’s choice of a lender and mortgage product. Previous 
research has indicated that distinct channels exist that funnel borrowers into lower or higher 
cost loan products (Apgar, Bendimerad, and Essene 2007). But little is known as to how 
borrowers seek out or are directed to such channels. A particular concern that this paper 
hopes to address is why black borrowers disproportionately have higher priced products. 
Some research indicates that even when credit worthiness is controlled for, blacks are 
overrepresented in the subprime sector and in higher-cost products (Bocian, Ernst, and Li 
2006). Through in-depth interviews with 32 borrowers, this research (1) highlights how 
borrowers seek mortgage credit and evaluate their mortgage options, and (2) demonstrates 
how borrowers make use of their social networks (friends and family) when making their 
decisions.  
 
The preliminary findings indicate that borrowers’ preferences and subsequent demands for 
mortgage products were shaped by the informal and formal advice they received. Those 
borrowers who consulted the most diverse sources of information had loans with lower 
interest rates. Those borrowers who received advice only from family and friends did not fare 
as well as those who received help from credit counselors. Thus, arguably, their loan 
outcomes varied not just based on if they consulted others, but especially whom they 
consulted. When given the right advice, potential homebuyers make better decisions in 
choosing both a lender and a loan. 
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1.0 Executive Summary 
For consumers, the purchase of a home represents the single largest purchase they will make 
in their lives. For most Americans, their home is their largest asset and can only be acquired 
by using a 30-year fixed-rate mortgage. Consequently, how consumers seek and obtain 
mortgage credit has tremendous implications for their ability to sustain homeownership and 
generate wealth. When borrowers make poor decisions regarding to their mortgages, it can 
cost them thousands of additional dollars in interest while exposing them to an elevated risk 
of foreclosure, thereby reducing the economic and social benefits associated with home-
ownership. Yet virtually no empirical research has examined how individuals reach a 
decision about the appropriateness of a mortgage product given their financial circumstances.  
This paper examines the demand side of the mortgage market. Through in-depth interviews 
with a small sample of borrowers, I test and further expand on hypotheses drawn from social 
capital theory, investigating the process that homebuyers undergo when purchasing a home 
and examining the influential factors that affect their decision and subsequent loan outcomes. 
In concurrence with previous research that suggests that some borrowers end up in the sub-
prime sector not because of the risk they present but because of their “demographic charac-
teristics, knowledge, and financial sophistication” (Lax et al. 2004), this research additionally 
explores how social networks influence borrowers’ choice of lender and loan product. 
The paper is organized in five sections. In the first section, social capital theory is applied 
and discussed in reference to previous research on borrower behavior in the mortgage 
market. In the second section, the transactional environment borrowers face is discussed and 
an overview of previous research on borrower behavior is presented. Previous research on the 
significance of the channel of mortgage origination to loan outcomes, how borrowers shop 
for a mortgage, and the usefulness of federally mandated disclosure forms is reviewed. In the 
third section, the study design and preliminary results, as well as the study’s limitations, are 
presented. The economic and social context of the mortgage marketplace in Atlanta, the site 
where the research was conducted, is described. In the fourth section, the implications of this 
research for policy and suggestions for future research are discussed. The last section 
presents concluding thoughts. 
Arguably, access and mobilization of social capital in the search for mortgage credit can 
prove beneficial for borrowers seeking mortgage financing in three ways.  
(1) Informing borrowers of their options and guiding their decision. 
(2) Distilling complex information presented by mortgage industry professionals. 
(3) Directly determining their course of action. 
Borrowers do not choose a mortgage in a marketplace where there is perfect information. 
Most borrowers are not rational actors, deciding on a mortgage product only on the basis of 
cost. Rather access to and use of social capital, defined as resources “embedded in a social 
structure” utilized in “purposive action” (Lin 2001), play a role in borrowers’ decisions. 
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Obtaining a mortgage in today’s mortgage market is a complicated process. When reaching a 
decision on a home loan, borrowers might feel compelled to use their social networks for 
information and guidance. Loan products have become increasingly complex. Federally 
mandated mortgage disclosure forms, instituted to display the cost of the mortgage transac-
tion and to prevent “the uninformed use of credit,” have been found to poorly convey the true 
cost of borrowing. Even with the help of a mortgage professional, finding a mortgage can be 
an overwhelming ordeal as “many consumers experience information overload”(Lee and 
Hogarth 1999). Given the amount of time and energy required to adequately understand and 
evaluate various loan options, it can be expected that borrowers will make use of others in 
their social networks for recommendations (Chang 2005).  
For black borrowers, equipping oneself with the knowledge of the mortgage lending process 
may safeguard one against the chance of being wrongly relegated to the subprime sector. A 
well-informed consumer not only is aware of available loans, but may pursue an alternative 
course of action such as waiting on the purchase of a home until he or she qualifies for a 
better rate or negotiating better loan terms. Access to and use of social capital influences the 
degree to which borrowers make informed decisions. 
This research focuses exclusively on black borrowers’ search for and obtaining of mortgage 
financing. An examination of the experiences of black borrowers is particularly important 
because previous quantitative research has not been successful in identifying the causes of 
racially divergent lending patterns. In cities across the country, black borrowers account for a 
disproportionately larger share of high-cost, subprime loans. Research has consistently found 
that race remains a significant predictor of an individual’s likelihood of receiving a subprime 
loan, even when other variables such as debt burden, credit history, employment stability, 
housing market conditions and neighborhood factors are controlled (NCRC 2003; Wyly et al. 
2006; Bocian, Ernst and Li 2006). Audit studies have also found that white prospective 
borrowers “received more advice, recommendations, and follow-up contacts from the loan 
officers” (Williams et al. 2005). 
While additional research on the pervasiveness of discrimination and its implications for the 
final price black borrowers pay for a mortgage loan is sorely needed, this paper takes a 
different approach. By comparing experiences within the black population, it examines how 
use of social capital plays a role in those instances when black borrowers secure mortgage 
credit at differing rates. Audit studies have demonstrated that the information loan officers 
provide informally to whites gives them an advantage in the mortgage marketplace (Williams 
et al. 2005). This supports the hypothesis presented in this paper that underlying social 
interactions affect the transactional environment borrowers face, including borrowers’ 
decisions on both their lender and their loan. Personal narratives reveal how blacks navigate 
the mortgage marketplace. A qualitative analysis allows for theory testing and further 
theoretical development.  
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Figure 1. Sources and Uses of Information by Black Borrowers Seeking Mortgage Credit 
(by lender type: subprime or prime) 
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This research suggests that borrowers do in fact make use of their social capital to gain 
information when making their decision to borrow and when choosing a lender. In general, 
the pattern emerged indicating that prime borrowers had been more proactive in their search 
for information, consulting both members of their social networks and other sources of 
information, including the Internet and paid professionals. They also were more likely to 
have friends and family members who worked in the banking and finance industry. Borrow-
ers with prime-rate loans also had more frequently been referred to their loan originator by 
someone they knew.  
Housing counselors were instrumental in educating consumers about their options and what 
to expect throughout the process. They instructed borrowers on how to negotiate a better rate 
and what questions to ask their lender. Family and friends, too, helped borrowers navigate 
the process. When borrowers asked friends or family for advice, they often intended to 
ensure that the information that they were being told was accurate. If they were quoted a rate, 
they often asked others to verify that the rate was “good.” While it is imperative for 
borrowers to be educated consumers, this is less important than having someone steer them 
in the right direction. Housing counselors often played a critical role not only in educating 
consumers, but also in referring them to trustworthy loan officers.  
Researchers and practitioners must move beyond thinking of homebuying as a merely 
economic decision, and realize that important social factors play into an individual’s choice 
of both a lender and a loan product. Often, when left to their own devices, borrowers make 
less-than-optimal decisions. Yet when given the right advice, potential homebuyers make 
better decisions, improve their financial circumstances, and are in a better position to sustain 
homeownership. 
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2.0 Applying a Social Capital Framework  
Sociologists view the market in social terms and have demonstrated that social capital 
significantly influences economic outcomes. Social capital can be defined as the aspects of 
social organization that enable and improve the efficiency of both individual and collective 
action. Most research on social capital has been applied in a limited way to educational 
attainment and labor market outcomes. There is, however, some research that examines the 
allocation of financial credit and financial decision-making that has demonstrated that social 
networks and capital are consequential. In his research on capital markets, Brian Uzzi, an 
economic sociologist, found that firms’ relationships with financial institutions influence the 
dispersal and pricing of financial capital (1999). Uzzi concludes that the use and maintenance 
of diverse social network ties produces informational benefits for both firms and lending 
institutions, which subsequently reduces the rates at which firms receive financial capital 
(1999). Similarly, economists Duflo and Saez have demonstrated that social capital and 
social learning affect the extent to which individuals enroll and contribute to retirement plans 
(2003). Using an experimental design, they show that individuals make critical financial 
decisions based on the actions of those around them, essentially demonstrating that social 
learning — when individuals learn from or mimic a behavior exhibited by others in a group 
— significantly affects important, long-term financial decisions. Lastly, research by Mariko 
Chang has demonstrated that their social networks are important conduits of financial 
information for most people (2005). 
Social capital theory has never explicitly been applied to the domain of borrower decision-
making in the mortgage market. However, research on the transactional environment sug-
gests that there is fertile ground for asserting a social capital story. For instance, respondents 
in a Federal Trade Commission study were found to base their decisions on social relations 
rather than reviewing disclosure forms. Researchers at the FTC found that borrowers made 
decisions “primarily on the reputation of the lenders, their trust in the loan originators, or the 
recommendations of friends, rather than carefully reading and understanding their loan 
disclosures themselves to learn the cost and terms of their loans, and to ensure that the 
features of the loans fit their needs and circumstances” (Lacko and Pappalardo 2007). 
Similarly, a nationally representative survey of borrowers conducted by Fannie Mae under 
the direction of Vada Hill found that “[a] trusted advisor is extremely important to African 
Americans” and that “trusted advisors are more important than other factors such as the 
lowest APR (annual percentage rate) available for a home mortgage” (Hill 2005). 
Social capital and network theory is premised on the idea that individuals maintain relation-
ships that have an effect on the opportunity structure and transactional environment they 
face. For borrowers, social capital can affect the transaction environment they face both 
indirectly and directly, in three main ways. 
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Table 2. Potential Effects of Social Capital Use on Borrowers’ Decision Making 
Indirect Effects Direct Effects 
• Information and Guidance 
• Filter of Complex Information • Loan Outcomes  
 
Firstly, borrowers’ decisions are influenced indirectly by the informational benefits supplied 
by their social network. Borrowers’ social networks provide them with crucial and protective 
tools by means of information flows, which inform them of their options and enable them to 
thoughtfully evaluate the advantages and disadvantages of a particular loan product. 
Borrowers with access to social resources are able to draw upon others for informational 
benefits, in terms of financial advice and guidance, to ensure that they receive the best 
available loan terms. Additionally, they may be advised on how to improve their credit 
standing to qualify for financing at lower interest rates. Hence, individuals could be buffered 
from being inappropriately channeled into higher-cost loans or the subprime segment of the 
market if and when they could qualify for loans at lower or prime rates.  
Secondly, borrowers’ social network may serve as a filter of complex information. Social 
learning helps borrowers to distill information provided by loan officers or mortgage brokers 
when making the decision to take out a home loan. As Burt, a social network theorist, 
contends, “given the volume of information that anyone can process, the network is an 
important screening device” (1992). Even when the information provided by one’s network 
is “fuzzy or inaccurate” it may “signal something to be looked into more carefully” (Burt 
1992). In the subprime sector, it is difficult for borrowers to shop around and fully 
understand the terms of their mortgages, due to the complexity of loan products. This 
complexity, combined with information asymmetries, may increase borrowers’ susceptibility 
to being sold disadvantageous loan products. Intermediaries, therefore, play a critical 
function by providing warnings of unwarranted fees and informing prospective borrowers of 
what costs are excessive. 
Finally, borrowers’ social ties may directly determine an their course of action. This occurs 
particularly when individuals are steered into a loan product, whether appropriate or 
inappropriate given their financial circumstances. When individuals rely on intermediaries, 
they may simply consent to mortgage product based upon the recommendation of those they 
trust.  
In all three instances I hypothesize that the use of social capital is consequential in terms of 
the information borrowers have available to them, affecting not only the decision-making 
process that borrowers undergo but also their loan outcomes. 
There are limitations, nevertheless, that might restrict the use of social networks as a source 
of information and guidance with regard to borrowers’ decisions on a lender and mortgage 
product. Borrowers may fail to seek information or utilize their social network for several 
reasons. First, they may lack ties, or access to the type of informational resources needed. A 
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network that provides a tremendous amount of social support may not be helpful when it 
comes to financial matters. Alternatively, a borrower’s social network may be ill equipped to 
provide the type of information sought. Similarly, if the information provided by a 
borrower’s family and friends is suspected to be of low quality and low accuracy, then he or 
she might be less inclined to call upon them. For example, if a borrower is the first in his or 
her family to own a home, it maybe of little use consulting family members about mortgage 
loan options. Lastly, even if a borrower’s social network could provide information that is 
beneficial, some people are not comfortable discussing personal financial matters with those 
close to them (Chang 2005). People who regard their credit score, savings, level of debt, and 
home purchase price as private and sensitive information are unlikely to disclose that 
personal information to others, regardless of whether they are family and friends. Granted 
these limitations, some borrowers may choose to forfeit or restrict the use of their social 
networks. 
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3.0 The Transactional Environment Borrowers Face 
A myriad of factors, from borrower behavior to the transactional environment, contribute to 
borrowers’ imperfect decision-making. Subprime borrowers in particular face a transactional 
environment in which it is difficult to evaluate alternative options, and information asym-
metries are pervasive. As loan products in the subprime sector are more complex, federally 
mandated disclosures are increasingly difficult to interpret. Borrowers, especially when they 
have or believe they have less than perfect credit, are often relegated to the subprime segment 
of the mortgage market. They often make this choice rather than exercising other, less costly, 
financing options, such as working to improve their credit or attempting to qualify for alter-
native types of loans such as those insured by the Federal Housing Administration1. Instead 
of rationally evaluating all alternatives and deciding on the option that renders the optimal 
result, it is more accurate to assume that borrowers “search for an action that is good enough” 
(March 1994). 
3.1 Mortgage Channel  
Research suggests that the channel through which borrowers initially seek mortgage credit 
influences their loan outcome. The borrowers whose loans are originated by locally oriented 
banks are a fifth as likely to be channeled into the subprime sector (Wyly et al. 2006). This is 
largely because most local banks and retail lenders specialize in originating low-cost prime 
loans (Apgar and Essene 2007). Relatively few lenders in the subprime sector conduct 
“direct-to-the-consumer” lending. Most of the top subprime lenders, half of which are 
subsidiaries or affiliate companies of major banks (Carr and Schuetz 2001), drum up their 
business through the use of correspondent lenders or brokers (Anshasy, Elliehausen and 
Shimazaki 2006). In today’s market, mortgage brokers issue 65 percent of all loans 
(Anshasy, Elliehausen and Shimazaki 2006). Yet borrowers who utilize brokers may be more 
susceptible to receiving a subprime product. While brokers are increasingly used as an 
avenue to mortgage credit, borrowers are often unaware of how brokers are compensated, 
how that compensation structure affects the loan terms they are offered, and the long-term 
costs they pay as a consequence. Borrowers are unaware that brokers are not obligated to 
offer them a mortgage at the best available rate. Instead, most borrowers believe that brokers 
work for them, a mistaken assumption that results in many borrowers who “think they do not 
have to price shop because they are paying a broker or loan officer to do that for them” 
(Willis 2006). In actuality, mortgage brokers receive a commission for charging borrowers a 
higher interest rate. Almost all borrowers who utilize brokers pay a yield spread premium, 
which can be a lucrative source of income for mortgage brokers but results in higher interest 
rates for borrowers (Jackson 2002). Moreover, brokers receive additional compensation by 
adding prepayment penalties to borrowers’ loan terms.2  
                                                 
1 Interestingly, while the number of subprime loan originations was growing from 2001 to 2005, the number of 
FHA loans was decreasing. 
2 While virtually nonexistent in the prime sector, where fewer than 2 percent of borrowers have prepayment 
penalties, these are pervasive in the subprime sector, where nearly 80 percent of borrowers have loans with 
prepayment penalties (Goldstein and Son 2003). Subprime loans with prepayment penalties are twice as 
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Because of glaring information asymmetries, brokers have a great deal of discretion that they 
can use to either exploit or benefit borrowers. “Broker counseling” can significantly reduce 
the information costs expended by borrowers (Anshasy, Elliehausen and Shimazaki 2006). 
Nevertheless, there exists no mechanism by which consumers can discern brokers of 
different quality, or whether a broker is acting in their best interest. Brokers have no fidu-
ciary duty and are therefore not legally responsible to act in the best interest of borrowers. 
Competition among brokers, arguably, could reduce the likelihood of borrowers being 
overcharged; as Anshasy, Elliehausen and Shimazaki note, “a broker quoting a higher price 
to receive a little more compensation risks receiving no compensation at all if the prospective 
borrower chooses a mortgage from a competitor” (2006). However, the effectiveness of 
competition limiting the degree to which borrowers are overcharged is contingent on the 
extent to which borrowers shop for the best available rate. 
3.2 Shopping for a Mortgage 
Shopping is assumed to facilitate optimal decision-making, as individuals who engage in 
shopping are thought to better evaluate their alternatives before reaching a final decision. Yet 
research indicates that this is not always the case. For less sophisticated borrowers, searching 
for alternative loan products may prove costly and inefficient, and does not ensure that one 
will get the best available rate (Lee and Hogarth 1999). Lee and Hogarth found that 
consumers who were refinancing were more likely to shop (1999). However, first-time 
homebuyers are a large share of the market, accounting for 26 percent of those purchasing 
newly built homes and 40 percent of those purchasing existing homes (Ivry 2007). Even for 
refinancers, information searches were beneficial only for those with “knowledge and 
experience” to be able to decipher the information obtained by contacting multiple brokers or 
lenders (Lee and Hogarth 1999).  
Furthermore, in comparison to prime borrowers, subprime borrowers have a more chal-
lenging time comparing loan products. Carr and Kolluri cite an Urban Institute analyst who 
argued that the lack of standardization in underwriting guidelines in the subprime sector 
creates a great deal of variation regarding prevailing rates, making it difficult for borrowers 
to determine and subsequently “‘shop’ for the most favorable rates” (2001). Willis argues 
that subprime borrowers are more likely to consent to disadvantageous loans in part because 
subprime loans are highly individualized and have more complicated structures than prime 
loans, making them more difficult for borrowers to compare to other loans (Willis 2006).  
Despite the greater difficulty in comparing loans in the subprime sector, prime and subprime 
borrowers do not differ in the degree to which they search for mortgage credit. A Federal 
                                                                                                                                                       
profitable for lenders as loans without them in the secondary market. In theory, subprime borrowers are more 
likely to refinance because they benefit even if interests rates do not change (if their credit improves and they 
qualify for a lower rate). Thus investors are willing to pay more for loans with prepayment penalties. Lenders 
consequently provide brokers with financial incentives to tack on prepayment penalties, often unnoticed by 
borrowers (www.mtgprofessor.com/A%20-%20Options/prepayment_penalty.htm). Furthermore, Lehman 
Brothers analyzed a database of 130,000 subprime loans and reported that just over half, 52.7 percent, of 
borrowers with prepayment penalties do prepay (Goldstein and Son 2003). 
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Trade Commission study found that within both groups there is a great deal of variance in 
borrowers’ shopping behavior. There are both prime and subprime borrowers “who did not 
shop at all, who shopped a little, and who shopped extensively” (Lacko and Pappalardo 
2007). However, subprime borrowers’ motivations when seeking multiple options may 
differ.  
Since subprime borrowers were more likely to be denied due to blemished credit history, 
they are more likely to contact multiple lenders out of necessity (Lacko and Pappalardo 
2007). The primary goal of shopping then shifts from getting the best rate to simply getting 
approved. In the end, for subprime borrowers, shopping may not increase the amount of 
information they receive, facilitate a better choice of lender, or improve their chances of 
receiving a loan at a lower rate. Moreover, it does not matter if subprime borrowers have a 
greater or lesser propensity to engage in shopping if the information attained does not factor 
into their making a better decision with regard to their mortgage product. 
3.3 Utility of Federally Mandated Disclosures 
Federally mandated disclosures were instituted to avoid the uninformed use of credit. In 
order to ensure that consumers are presented with accurate information regarding the terms 
of their mortgage, federally mandated disclosures were intended to display the cost of the 
mortgage transaction to borrowers. However, research has indicated that disclosure forms 
poorly convey the true cost of mortgage loans to borrowers.  
A Federal Trade Commission study of the effectiveness of current mortgage disclosure forms 
discovered that a large share of consumers did not know how to interpret the forms correctly 
(Lacko and Pappalardo 2007). When tested, most were unable to recognize the costs and 
terms of mortgages they were presented shown. Furthermore, “many consumers experience 
information overload from the disclosures” (Lee and Hogarth 1999). When compared, prime 
and subprime borrowers did not differ significantly on this point. Both were likely to have 
difficulty acquiring basic information about loan terms, such as the APR, the amount 
financed, and the computation of discount fees. In general the FTC study found that the more 
complex the loan, the greater difficulty borrowers have understanding the disclosure forms 
(Lacko and Pappalardo 2007). The utility of such disclosures is vastly reduced when 
information presented to consumers is not interpretable by them. 
The consequences of making a poor decision are steep when it comes to choosing a mort-
gage. However, most borrowers, particularly in the subprime sector, face a complex and 
disadvantageous transactional environment. When borrowers do not understand the terms of 
their mortgage and the fees associated with the transaction, they are more likely to be victims 
of lending abuses and to be charged “fees that far exceeded what would be expected justified 
based on economic grounds” (U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development and U.S. 
Department of Treasury Joint Report 2000). 
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4.0 Study Design and Findings 
4.1 Setting the Stage: A Study of Mortgage Lending in Atlanta 
A sprawling housing market with high levels of suburbanization, segregation, subprime 
lending and foreclosures make Atlanta an interesting city to study borrower behavior in the 
mortgage market. The city ranks fifth among all metropolitan areas in the U.S. in terms of the 
number of conventional home purchase loans issued by subprime lenders in 2004 
(www.dataplace.org). 
Figure 4.1.0. Conventional Purchase Mortgage Loans by Subprime 
Lenders for the Atlanta, GA, Metro Area, 1997–2004 
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Atlanta was the most segregated of all sunbelt cities and the fourth most segregated city in 
the U.S. in 1990 (Keating 2001). In addition to high levels of residential segregation, racial 
disparities in high-cost lending exist. High-cost loans are concentrated in predominately 
black neighborhoods in the Atlanta metro area. 
A study conducted by HUD found that subprime loans are five times more likely to be made 
in black neighborhoods than in white neighborhoods in metro Atlanta (2000). Furthermore, 
homeowners who reside in black middle-class neighborhoods were nearly twice as likely as 
homeowners residing in low-income white neighborhoods to receive subprime loans (Kanell 
and Paul 2007). Among black moderate- to upper-income households, 44.2 percent of loans 
are high-cost (National Community Reinvestment Coalition 2007). According to a study 
released by the NCRC, moderate- to upper-income blacks are 3.14 times more likely to 
receive high-cost loans than moderate- to upper-income whites in Atlanta (2007).  
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Table 4.1.1. Racial Disparities in Rates of High-Cost Loans 
MSA 
% High-Cost 
Loans to 
Moderate- to 
Upper-Income 
African Americans
% High-Cost 
Loans to 
Moderate- to 
Upper-Income 
Whites 
High-Cost 
Disparity Rate 
Atlanta-Sandy Springs–Marietta, GA 44.2% 14.1% 3.14 
Boston-Quincy, MA 49% 14.7% 3.33 
Detroit-Livonia-Dearborn, MI 63.6% 25.3% 2.52 
New York–White Plains–Wayne, NY-NJ 45.8% 19.6% 2.34 
Source: “Income is No Shield Against Racial Differences in Lending.” NCRC, July 2007. 
When compared to other metropolitan areas, Atlanta leads the nation in the percentage of 
borrowers opting for adjustable-rate and interest-only mortgages loans (Downey 2006). In 
addition to high rates of subprime lending, Atlanta has experienced a dramatic increase in the 
number of foreclosures. Roughly one in ten homes with a mortgage in the Atlanta area has 
experienced severe delinquency, if not full foreclosure (Apgar and Duda 2005). Nearly one 
in five subprime mortgages in Georgia defaulted in the first quarter of 2007, a higher rate 
than the national rate of 13.5 percent (Kanell and Paul 2007). Unlike other areas of the 
country, however, Georgia has not seen as sharp a decline in house prices. In the first quarter 
of 2007, house prices in the Atlanta area actually increased (see Table 4.1.2).  
Table 4.1.2. Freddie Mac Conventional Mortgage House Price Index 
Conventional Mortgage House Price Index, 2007 (all entries are in percent changes).  
Note: Figure presents nominal, not real, price levels.  
Source: Freddie Mac, www.freddiemac.com-finance-cmhpi-current-excel-msas.xls.  
Nevertheless, when compared to the number of foreclosures in 2000, the number of fore-
closures in 2006 represents a 200 percent increase (Atlanta Regional Commission 2007). 
4.2 Study Design  
In order to unveil the course of events that homebuyers undergo when searching for mort-
gage credit and to investigate how borrowers make use of social capital while engaging in the 
search for mortgage credit, I drew on qualitative data, collected through in-depth interviews 
with homeowners in the Atlanta metropolitan area. The sources of information consulted and 
 Quarterly 
Change 
Annualized  
Quarterly Change 
  
Annual Change  
Q1 2007–Q2 2007 Q1 2007–Q2 2007 Q2 2006–Q2 2007
Atlanta-Sandy Springs–Marietta GA 0.56 2.25 3.79 
Boston-Quincy MA MSAD  –1.49 –5.84 –2.38 
Detroit-Livonia-Dearborn MI MSAD  –1.95 –7.57 –3.52 
New York–Wayne-White Plains NY-NJ  –0.57 –2.26 2.40 
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the sequence of interactions that prime and subprime borrowers underwent in order to 
procure a mortgage were analyzed. 
All borrowers who participated were compensated with a $25 gift card to their choice of 
Target or Home Depot. In total, 33 interviews were completed with homebuyers, though two 
white borrowers were later dropped from the sample, for a total of 31 black households. Each 
interview ranged from 45 minutes to over one hour in length. Respondents were asked a 
series of questions that included open- and closed-ended questions. A range of subject matter 
was addressed in the interviews, but the questions could be organized along four major 
dimensions: 
• Borrower Demographics  
• Borrower Financial Characteristics  
• Social Capital Variables 
• Loan Terms and Structuring 
4.2.1 Recruitment of Subjects 
Homeowners were selected based on the criteria that they resided in owner-occupied homes 
in the Atlanta metropolitan area and were at least 18 years old. Additionally, interviewed 
homebuyers had to have purchased or refinanced in the last 10 years. Potential subjects were 
recruited in two ways. First, some respondents were sent recruitment materials in the mail. 
Public deed records maintained by the Georgia Superior Court Real Estate Deed Index that 
are available online were utilized to determine the names and addresses of potential subjects. 
These public deed records include the date the loan was issued, the company or bank that 
issued the loan, and the amount of the loan. Occasionally information about the borrower’s 
marital status and various aspects of the loan structure and terms are also detailed in the deed. 
Additionally, whether a foreclosure has been issued is available as well. As hundreds of 
thousands of records exists, several criteria were used to select records (see appendix for 
more information on sample selection). In general records were utilized to determine the 
names and addresses of potential subjects who lived in census tracts in which subprime loans 
constitute 25 percent or more of all conventional mortgage loan originations. Census tracts 
were additionally selected based on their racial and income composition. Borrowers recruited 
in this manner constituted approximately 10 percent of the total sample.  
The second method by which respondents were recruited was through referrals from credit 
counseling agencies (24 borrowers were referred by three different agencies), and referrals 
from the housing department of an Atlanta-based legal-aid organization (five borrowers). 
One borrower was recruited through snowball sampling.  
To ensure that my analysis was multilevel, I also conducted a series of expert interviews to 
develop a fuller picture of borrowers’ experience searching for mortgage loans, and to get a 
feel for the local mortgage industry and housing policy context. I spoke with mortgage 
brokers and loan officers (six in total) to gain their perspective on the services they provide to 
borrowers, in addition to how they differentiate borrowers and what types of borrowers opt 
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for different mortgage products. I also spoke with housing counselors who provide both 
prepurchase and postpurchase counseling as well as foreclosure-prevention counseling (four 
counselors from three agencies) and held a focus group of local housing counselors. The 
focus group was held to further elucidate what practitioners felt were factors contributing to 
high rates of foreclosure and the challenges they experience counseling homeowners (12 to 
15 counselors were in attendance). Additionally, I spoke with several housing policy special-
ists, including a legal scholar, a legal aid housing attorney, a state councilman, and officials 
at the city and county levels. Lastly, I attended a public forum for practitioners in Atlanta on 
preserving homeownership and several educational seminars for housing counselors on credit 
counseling and credit scoring. I also attended seminars for consumers on preserving home-
ownership and being fiscally responsible.  
4.2.2 Demographics of the Sample 
Table 4.2.2. Demographics of Interview Subjects 
Demographics N = Percent 
Marital status: 
Married  
Widowed 
Separated 
Divorced 
Never married 
 
7 
2 
1 
14 
9 
 
21% 
6% 
3% 
43% 
27% 
Total household income over the past 12 months: 
Less than $24,999 
$25,000 to $49,999 
$50,000 to $74,999 
$75,000 to $99,999 
$100,000 or more 
Not reported 
 
9 
10 
12 
1 
0 
1 
 
28% 
30% 
36% 
3% 
0% 
3% 
Gender: 
Male  
Female 
 
8 
26 
  
24% 
76% 
Race: 
Black 
White 
 
32 
2 
 
93% 
7% 
Age:  
Youngest  
Oldest  
Mean 
Median 
  
28 years 
81 years 
49 years 
53 years 
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Highest level of education: 
Less than high school (grade 11 or less)  
High school diploma, GED or equivalent 
Technical or trade school 
Some college 
Associates degree or two-year degree 
Bachelors degree 
Some graduate training 
Graduate or professional degree 
 
3 
5 
1 
8 
3 
6 
1 
7 
 
9% 
15% 
3% 
23% 
9% 
18% 
3% 
20% 
Households with children under the age of 18  13 39% 
Note: Total sample (N = 33 households, 34 individuals). 
4.3 Limitations of the Study 
The small sample size does not allow for statistical projections or generalizations, but does 
allow for theoretical testing and provides rich accounts of borrowers’ experiences. The low 
response rate of subjects recruited through mailers resulted in a sizable portion of the sample 
being referred from credit counseling agencies (24 of the 33 households originally in the 
study). As a result, individuals in the sample had a greater likelihood of having sought credit 
counseling than would be expected for the population as a whole. Not all borrowers referred 
by credit counseling agencies had previously received prepurchase counseling. Several 
borrowers had experienced a period of difficulty paying their mortgage and were receiving 
counseling in order to get a loan modification agreement, or were seeking advice prior to 
refinancing. This allows for a unique comparison of individuals who received credit 
counseling at various stages of the process, against those who did not, as well as an 
examination of the role of credit counseling in borrowers’ final decisions.  
Black borrowers constituted nearly the entire sample (94 percent). However there was a great 
deal of diversity among the sample in terms of income, age and place of residence. Almost 
13 percent of the black borrowers interviewed were of Caribbean descent (either first or 
second generation immigrants to the United States). Many of the respondents lived in census 
tracts that were racially mixed. Only 9 out of the final 31 households included in the study 
resided in majority black census tracts (census tracts that are more than 50 percent black). 
Several respondents (5 of the 9) who lived in neighborhoods that were predominately black, 
lived in solidly black middle-class neighborhoods. These neighborhoods had high median 
incomes (ranging from $57,059 to $74,986) and populations in which a minimum of 30 
percent of individuals 25 and older had bachelors or graduate degrees.  
By focusing nearly exclusively on the experiences of black borrowers, several possible 
explanations for why subprime loans are disproportionably concentrated in predominately 
black households and in predominately black neighborhoods could be ascertained. While the 
demographic make-up of the sample does not allow for comparisons across racial groups in 
terms of the experience of borrowers, it does bring to light that there is both a great deal of 
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diversity of experiences and some distinguishable patterns among the experiences of black 
borrowers. 
4.4 Types of Borrowers 
When compared to subprime borrowers, prime borrowers seemed to differ not only in their 
use of social capital, but also in terms of the availability of experts in their social circles. In 
general, a pattern emerged where prime borrowers were more proactive in their search for 
information, consulting both their social networks and as well as other sources of 
information, including the Internet and paid professionals. They also were more likely to 
have friends and family members who worked in the banking and finance industry. 
In order to determine the influence of social capital on both borrower decision-making and 
loan outcomes, borrowers were grouped into three categories and their loan outcomes were 
compared. The first category was composed of borrowers who reported receiving no advice 
(borrowers who did not consulted anyone when arriving at a decision with regard to their 
mortgage) (N = 6), combined with those borrowers who consulted only a mortgage broker or 
lender (N = 3). The second category of borrowers were those who consulted some 
combination or at least one of the following: a friend, family member, religious official, 
neighbor, contractor/builder, or other person (N = 9). The last group of borrowers reported 
having consulted a private financial advisor or credit counselor (N = 12). While the 
experiences of borrowers in each category were diverse, noticeable patterns emerged in terms 
of their loan structures and outcomes. 
4.4.1 Going It Alone: Solitary Decision-Makers 
When left to their own devices, borrowers often made less-than-optimal decisions. When 
asked why they had not consulted family or friends when shopping for a mortgage, these 
borrowers often replied that they did not want to “bother anybody.” Borrowers who fell into 
this category were older adults and were longtime homeowners. The average age of 
borrowers in this category was 64, with the youngest borrower being 43 years old. Seven (of 
the nine) had lived in their homes for over ten years, three such borrowers having lived in 
their homes for 27, 30, and 38 years.  
Solitary decision-makers were the most self-reliant, and they often made costly mistakes. 
Except for one person, all borrowers in this group had subprime products. Their loan 
structuring was typical of borrowers with subprime products: over two-thirds of borrowers in 
this category had adjustable-rate mortgages and only 2 of the 9 borrowers reported that their 
property taxes and insurance were included in their monthly mortgage payment. Six of the 
nine had refinanced three or more times over an average period of 7.6 years, severely 
reducing the equity held in their homes. These borrowers refinanced into subprime products 
rather than transitioning to prime rate loans, consistent with evidence from a survey 
conducted by Freddie Mac, which found that 60 percent of subprime borrowers refinanced 
into subprime loans (Courchane et al.).  
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Borrowers in this category were the most disadvantaged with regard to having friends or 
family members with expertise in banking or finance. Only two of the nine had a friend or 
family member working in the banking and finance industry. In addition to failing to consult 
friends or family members, few borrowers in this category sought information or assistance 
from other sources. While similar to other types of borrowers in consulting neither a pastor, 
minister or other religious official, nor their neighbors, these borrowers were unique in that 
they also failed to use the Internet to inform their decisions.  
Lastly, borrowers in this group did not compare alternatives or engage in extensive shopping. 
Of the nine borrowers, only one contacted more than one lender. Three borrowers, more than 
any other category, responded to offers received in the mail. Several were completely reliant 
on their mortgage broker when choosing their loan. Among all types of borrowers, solitary 
decision-makers were the least informed. 
The interest rates of borrowers in this category are reported in the table below. In terms of 
loan outcomes, borrowers in this category did not fare well; several were victims of abusive 
lending practices.  
Table 4.4.1. Loan Outcomes of Solitary Decision-Makers (N = 9) 
Loan Structure Interest Rate Type of Loan 
2–28 16%*  Subprime 
2–28 8.25% to 14.25% Subprime 
2–28 7.41% to 10.41% Subprime 
2–28 7.1% to 14.1% Subprime 
2–28 6.9% to 9.9% Subprime 
30 9.63%* Subprime 
ARM 5.5% to 10.5%* Prime 
80–20 Unreported Subprime 
Unreported Unreported Subprime 
Notes: Information reported in this and subsequent borrower loan outcome tables was self-
reported (indicated by *) by borrowers or taken from property deeds. A loan was determined to 
be subprime based on the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) lists of 
specialized lenders. Three borrowers were not included in tables 4.4.1, 4.4.2 and 4.4.3 as they 
had not yet closed on their loans; however, their demographic information is included in the 
sample demographics table (4.2.2). 
Larry McAdams’s Story  
Mr. McAdams purchased his current home, his first home, 17 years ago. A high-school graduate 
with a good union job, working as a conductor on the metro-rail line, he brings in around 
$63,000 a year. While 54 and divorced, his income alone makes him middle class in Atlanta. A 
proud father, he is devoted to his three daughters, the youngest of whom graduated from high 
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school in May. For him, being a father means being there when his girls need him. His love for 
his daughters drove him to a custody battle that cost him over $30,000. The bitter dispute was 
worth every penny in his eyes because gaining custody of his daughters meant they would be 
safe from maltreatment by their “unfit stepfather.” But lawyers cost money. The mounting 
expenses drove Mr. McAdams to refinance his home. 
At the time Mr. McAdams refinanced he went to just one mortgage company and did not speak 
to anybody about his decision. He did not use the Internet to search for options or to compare 
rates. His idea of his creditworthiness was based on whether he was approved: if he was 
approved, then his credit must be good. His monthly mortgage payments did not include 
property taxes or insurance, though he would have preferred this.  
While he knew he was getting an adjustable-rate mortgage, the broker told him explicitly that he 
could refinance in just two years, as long as he paid on time. When two years came, Mr. 
McAdams went back to the mortgage company, but the broker he worked with was nowhere to 
be found. The manager told him that nothing could be done about his loan. As the interest rate 
on his loan continued to increase, keeping up with the payment and his other financial 
responsibilities put him in a position of financial strain. As he stated, “it got [to] where I couldn’t 
afford it and pay my ex support and keep on living.” Fortunately the mortgage broker had signed 
a letter promising Mr. McAdams that he would indeed refinance the loan after a period of two 
years. With the help of a lawyer and this letter, Mr. McAdams, in a rare instance, was able to 
work out a solution with his lender. However, the consequences of this troubling transaction 
don’t end with the loan modification agreement. As Mr. McAdams expressed with regret, “they 
overappraised my house, that makes it double hard for me to sell my house now.” 
 
4.4.2 With the Help of Friends, Family, and Others 
The second category of borrowers made use of their social networks by consulting a family 
member or friend. While these borrowers consulted their social networks, only four of the 
nine had friends or family members who worked in banking or finance. While none of these 
borrowers consulted a private financial advisor or credit counselor, five of the nine sought 
assistance from a mortgage broker. Given the lack of expertise within their personal 
networks, one might have expected these borrowers to have consulted alternative sources of 
information in addition to their personal networks. Yet these borrowers did not employ a 
more expansive search strategy. Only four of the nine made use of the Internet, and just four 
borrowers contacted more than one lender.  
What is also surprising is that this group was exclusively composed of first-time homebuyers, 
who might be expected to compensate for their lack of experience by employing more 
rigorous searches. Nearly half of the borrowers in this group were purchasing their first home 
later in life; they ranged in age from 42 to 57 years. Many intended this to be their first and 
last home. When asked if they had intentions to move, seven of the nine stated that they had 
planned on living in their homes “forever,” or “till I die,” which contradicted the fact that 
five of nine had adjustable-rate mortgages, generally a product appropriate for borrowers 
with intentions to move before the full term of the loan is reached.  
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How did they fare in their loan choices when compared to solitary decision-makers? Only 
one of the nine borrowers in this category had a prime loan. This borrower consulted friends, 
family members, a mortgage broker and a contractor before deciding on his fixed-rate 
mortgage, which he received from a large regional bank. While several borrowers in this 
group had considerably better loan outcomes than solitary decision-makers, overall they did 
not perform as well as the next category of borrowers. See table 4.4.2 for details of their loan 
outcomes. 
Table 4.4.2. Loan Outcomes of Borrowers Who Consulted Friends, Family and 
Others (N = 9) 
Loan Structure Interest Rate Prime or Subprime 
2–28 8.45% to 14.45% Subprime 
ARM Unreported Subprime 
Option ARM 3.888% to 9.9% Subprime 
2–28 9.75% to 15.75% Subprime 
30 7.8%* Unidentified 
2–28 8.5% to 14.5% Subprime 
2–28 7.65% to 14.65% Subprime 
30 6.5%* Prime 
30 6%* Unidentified 
 
The Cheathams’s Story 
The Cheathams moved into their home just under two years ago. It was their first home, and 
Mr. Cheatham described it as a blessing from God. Having moved down south from New York 
City, they reveled in the simple joys that accompanied homeownership, like having a garage 
and a garden.  
The Cheathams first found a house, then sought financing. They spent quite a bit of time 
searching for the perfect home. However, they spent considerably less time searching for a  
mortgage or attempting to understand the cost of obtaining mortgage credit. They used the 
Internet to find their home, but did not use it to search for a mortgage. Even the advice they 
sought from the one friend they consulted had more to do with finding a home than qualifying 
for financing. 
Admittedly, they were “more concerned in getting approved at almost any cost” and thus they 
“just went along with what was available.” They did not understand credit and believed their 
loan consultant, who told them that they qualified for only one loan option because of their 
credit history, despite their having a 686 FICO credit score. They felt very uncomfortable asking 
questions about the prospective loan, and when they did ask questions they were placed on 
hold, shuffled around, or told to call this person or that person, never getting a clear or direct 
answer. The terms of their loan were not explained to them until the closing, which is  
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particularly unfortunate because of the complexity of their loan product, an 80-20 ARM. They 
are now worried about losing their home, as the larger loan will reset in the next few months.  
 
4.4.3 The Expert Advised/Credit Counseled  
This category of borrowers consists of those who reported consulting a private financial 
advisor or credit counselor. While these borrowers turned to a financial expert, they also 
made use of their social networks. Every borrower in this category consulted a friend or 
family member. Eight were referred to the lender who originated their loan by a personal 
acquaintance. Eight of the ten had a friend or family member who worked in the banking and 
finance industry. Out of the three categories of borrowers, they were by far the most active in 
their search for information.  
With regard to their loan outcomes, eight of the ten borrowers in this category had prime-rate 
loans (the other two lenders were not identified as either prime or subprime). All had fixed-
rate products, generally with lower interest rates than the two previous categories of 
borrowers. See table 4.4.3 for details of their loan outcomes. 
Table 4.4.3. Loan Outcomes for Expert Advised/Credit Counseled Borrowers  
(N = 10) 
Loan Structure Interest Rate (percent) Prime or Subprime 
30 7.25%* Prime 
30 6.25%* Prime 
30 5.875%* Prime 
30 5.875%* Unidentified 
30 5.85%* Prime 
30 5.75%* Prime 
30 5.25%* Prime 
30 5%* Unidentified 
30 Unreported Prime 
30 Unreported Prime 
 
Gladys’s Story 
Sitting across from her, one immediately notices a sense of grace. Not a strand of hair on her 
head was out of place and her makeup was picture-perfect. It was hard to imagine that just a 
few years ago she was homeless. Having escaped an abusive marriage, Gladys lived in a 
homeless shelter until she got back on her feet. She unflinchingly mentions this part of her life 
when asked what motivated her to become a homeowner. She did not at any moment believe 
that homeownership was in her grasp. It was her social worker who suggested the idea of 
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buying a home. Considering what she was paying in rent, she could afford a monthly mortgage. 
Her social worker informed her of programs that would help her purchase a home. Not soon 
after, Gladys enrolled in a first-time homebuyer program, and with the help of counselors at a 
church-based housing counseling agency, she worked to improve her credit. The housing 
counselors directed her to a loan officer at a bank, a bank that she did not believe would lend to 
a “little person” like her. Even with the reassurance of the housing counselors she was still 
surprised to find that she was approved for a loan. The housing counselors were there every 
step of the way, even helping her understand the terms of her loan. In the end, homeownership 
has elicited a tremendous sense of personal accomplishment for Gladys. 
4.5 A Tale of Two Borrowers 
Achieving homeownership through the use of an inappropriate loan product not only costs 
borrowers thousands of additional dollars, but also undermines the social and economic 
benefits gained through homeownership. It is therefore important to understand the course of 
events that homeowners undergo when searching for mortgage credit that may lead them to 
either appropriate or inappropriate mortgage products. Borrowers who might otherwise be 
very similar may end up with vastly different mortgage products when they fail to consult 
others and instead make decisions based on limited information. Below I describe an instance 
that I encountered of just that contrast in situations: two women who were very similar when 
they began the search for a mortgage credit had very different loan outcomes. 
4.5.1 Their Stories  
Ms. Park and Ms. Smith both initially began thinking about purchasing a home because of 
the potential benefits owning a home would provide their children. When asked what 
prompted her to consider becoming a homeowner, Ms. Park stated, “Children…they need 
space to run, instead of me always yelling ‘You know there are people underneath you’ 
[chuckles]…To have that space.” Similarly, Ms. Smith remarked, “Having my boys, I just 
wanted them to have their own space to run around in and not be all cramped up like I was 
when I was little.”  
Though comparable in many regards (both single mothers with comparable incomes, 
purchasing homes that were similarly priced), these women had completely different 
experiences searching for a mortgage. Although both initially had credit scores of 620, Ms. 
Park shopped around and eventually got her loan from a nationally known bank. Ms. Smith 
went with a mortgage broker referred to her by her real estate agent. The use of a bank versus 
mortgage broker was not the only difference that affected their loan outcomes.  
When Ms. Park first began the process of buying a home, she meet with a broker who told 
her he could get her a loan. But she decided to shop around and met a with a second broker 
who told her if she waited and improved her credit she could qualify for a better rate. After 
receiving this information, she signed up for a prepurchase homebuyers class. With the help 
of credit counselors, she learned not only what financial cost to anticipate in becoming a 
homeowner, but also how to budget and improve her credit. Within seven months she had 
The Use of Social Capital in Borrower Decision-Making 
 
 February 2008 21 
improved her score to a 660. She took advantage of a local down-payment assistance 
program and qualified for a $5,000 forgivable loan to use as a down payment. In contrast, 
Ms. Smith did not make a down payment and received 100 percent financing. She worked 
with a broker who led her to believe that she could easily refinance her adjustable-rate loan in 
just two years. Her loan was set to adjust up in September 2007, and refinancing it has not 
proven as easy as her broker originally suggested. Ms. Smith felt that she had been lied to 
and is now seriously considering moving from her home back into an apartment.  
Table 4.5.1. Two Borrowers Compared  
Ms. Park 
• 3 children, single mother 
• Gradate degree  
• Is a behavioral scientist 
• Parents were homeowners 
Ms. Smith 
• 2 children, single mother 
• Some college and trade school  
• Is a medical assistant 
• Parents were not homeowners 
Ms. Park’s Loan Ms. Smith’s Loan 
House Value: 
Down Payment: 
Loan Amount: 
Loan Term: 
 
Annual Interest Rate 
Monthly Payment 
 
 
Total Finance Charge 
Over the Life of the Loan 
$135,000 
$5,000 
$130,000 
30 years fixed 
 
6.125% 
$789.89 
 
 
 
$154,364.09 
House Value: 
Down Payment: 
Loan Amount: 
Loan Term: 
 
Initial Interest Rate 
Initial Monthly Payment  
Rate at Year Three 
Payment at Year Three 
Total Finance Charge 
Over the Life of the Loan  
$130,000 
0 
$130,000 
2 years fixed, 
28 years 
adjustable 
8.5%  
$999.59 
11.5% 
$1,278.00 
$323,395.08 
4.6 Use of Social Capital  
In addition to differences in the frequency of social capital use among borrowers, the content 
of the information received differentiates borrowers and shapes the choices borrowers make 
in important ways. The assistance typically received by those borrowers who made use of 
their social networks, in addition to those who consulted credit counselors, had three utilities. 
They drew upon their social networks for information and guidance, to distill complex 
information, and for lender referrals. The formal and informal advice and consultation 
borrowers received shaped their preferences and subsequent demands for mortgage products. 
4.6.1 Information and Guidance 
Housing counselors were instrumental in educating consumers about their options and what 
to expect throughout the process. Family and friends, too, helped borrowers navigate the 
process. Borrowers were instructed on how to negotiate a better rate and told what questions 
to ask their lender. In addition to how to’s, borrowers were given do’s and don’ts. A young 
teacher’s mother told her to negotiate for the best interest rate and gave her questions to ask 
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the loan officer with whom she was working. A 28-year-old mechanic was told by his mother 
“don’t bite off more than you can chew” and “live within your means.” 
Borrowers were able to weigh their options in part by learning from the experiences of other 
homeowners. In many instances, more experienced homeowners helped to reassure them that 
they were making solid choices or moving in the right direction. As one borrower 
commented, 
“Because I have never owned anything before, I really want to talk to someone, people 
who did own something, own a home, just to get a peace of mind, I was really 
nervous the last 5 or 6 months. I was asking questions constantly.”  
Borrowers frequently depended on friends and family as sounding boards, discussing loan 
terms and rates with them and often adhering to their advice when making their final decision 
on a mortgage product. 
The most proactive borrowers were concerned about making the right choices and making 
informed decisions. They attended homeownership education seminars, in addition to 
speaking with more experienced homeowners. One such young man held a “council of 
advisors” with whom he consulted before making the decision to purchase his home. Despite 
having saved in preparation for homeownership, these borrowers did not have a substantial 
sum to use toward a down payment. Many qualified for down-payment assistance programs 
and first-time homebuyer programs, which required that they attend a homebuyer education 
class and/or receive credit counseling. The advice and direction they received facilitated 
better loan outcomes in terms of lower interest rates.  
4.6.2 Distilling Complex Information 
Several borrowers commented on the fact that friends and family served to validate 
information received. As one woman stated when asked about the advice she had received 
from family and friends: 
“You know, if my Realtor or if the broker told me something that I may, might be 
unsure about, I would ask them, you know, how was it for you when you bought your 
house and they would, you know, tell me their experience or tell me if something 
sounded a little funny to them, or give me questions to go back to ask.” 
If they were quoted a rate, they often asked others to verify that the rate was “good.” One 
borrower frequently sought advice from a childhood friend who worked in the mortgage 
industry. As she remarked:  
“Yeah, every time I talked to somebody I conferred to him to make sure that I was 
getting good information. Basically I would relate to him whatever was related to me 
by whatever individual I’d talked to. And if it didn’t sound good to him, then I would 
go back and see what else could be done, worked out or said.” 
The Use of Social Capital in Borrower Decision-Making 
 
 February 2008 23 
Borrowers who worked with housing counselors often discussed their loan terms with them 
and these housing counselors were instrumental in helping them understand the conditions of 
their loan. Borrowers are often at an inherent informational disadvantage, yet those who 
make use of their social capital often gained a filter through which they could make sense of 
the complex information. 
4.6.3 Direct Instruction 
While it is important for borrowers to be educated consumers, the importance of this 
education is often of less consequence than having someone who will steer them in the right 
direction. Often housing counselors provided an instrumental role not only in educating 
consumers, but also in steering them in the right direction. Many of the borrowers who 
worked with credit counselors did not engage in extensive loan shopping. Half (six out of 12) 
of these borrowers consulted only one company when searching for mortgage financing. Five 
of the 12 were directed to a loan officer, usually at a bank, who worked with the housing 
counseling agency to ensure that the borrower was presented with the best possible deal. In 
addition, borrowers who worked with credit counselors often discussed their loan terms with 
their counselors, who were instrumental in helping them understand the conditions of their 
loan. Thus these intermediaries often played an instrumental role in ensuring that borrowers 
got the best possible product. 
Just as borrowers can be steered into inappropriate products when they rely completely on 
mortgage professionals, they can also be steered into products that fit their financial 
circumstances with the help of credit counselors as well as friends and family. 
4.7 Reasons Borrowers Make “Bad” Decisions 
Those borrowers who consulted the most diverse sources of information almost always had a 
less risky loan with lower interest rates. Those borrowers who consulted only family and 
friends did not fare as well as those who were helped by housing counselors. Borrowers who 
only made use of their social networks may not have had a friend or family member who 
worked in the banking and finance industry. Moreover, several borrowers in this category 
relied heavily on the advice received from their mortgage broker. Even if family or friends 
bestow “good” advice, borrowers may defer to the mortgage broker whom they see as a 
professional or expert. For instance, one borrower, despite her parents’ constant bemoaning 
for her to “go to the bank, go to the bank,” decided otherwise. Due to her concerns about her 
creditworthiness (despite reporting a FICO credit score of 672 at the time of application), she 
took the advice of her real estate agent, who told her to that if she chose a mortgage company 
to assist her, she would have a better chance of being approved. 
4.7.1 Overreliance on Mortgage Industry Professionals with Divergent Interests 
Vulnerability comes when too much discretion is placed in the hands of mortgage profes-
sionals and others who may or may not have the borrowers’ and their families’ best interest 
at heart. Those borrowers who failed to verify what they were told by their real estate agent 
or mortgage broker were often in the most disadvantageous position. Most homeowners who 
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refinanced did not seek advice from family or friends regarding their decision and were more 
likely to rely on their mortgage broker or loan officer as their sole provider of information. 
As a 37-year-old single mother described her interaction with her mortgage broker: 
“He told me what the best plan was for me. When I told him my number-one concern 
was keeping my payment down, where it was. He got to crunching some figures and 
said ‘oh here is what we can do.’ And that is when he went and asked, ‘You know, do 
you have any other debts that you want to consolidate into this?’ And I said, ‘I’d love 
to as long as I can keep my monthly payments at X amount.’ And he said, ‘fine, great, 
we are doing it.’” 
It is not uncommon for borrowers to allow brokers to determine the best loan for them, 
leaving the broker with utmost discretion in determining their loan outcome. The borrowers I 
interviewed who were completely reliant on mortgage brokers to determine their loan 
outcome were easy targets for predatory lenders.  
4.7.2 Information Asymmetries 
Even informed consumers may make bad decisions because they do not have the expert 
knowledge that loan officers and mortgage brokers have. This inherent disadvantage is 
significantly reduced when borrowers make use of a credit counselor or have individuals 
within their social network from whom they can distill complex information. 
Borrowers who did not seek advice or help distilling information often did so for one of two 
reasons. First, borrowers, particularly solitary decision-makers, felt that they had to make the 
decision independently. They were often the ones to whom others in their social circle turned 
for advice, support and financial assistance when in need. Elderly homeowners with 
substantial equity in their homes, who were frequently the least sophisticated of all 
borrowers, often stated that they did not consult or ask others about their decision to 
refinance or have someone go over their loan documents because they did not want to 
“bother” others. Additionally, many elderly homeowners wanted to maintain a sense of 
control over their finances. This desire for control almost always set them up for trouble. 
Several unknowingly agreed to adjustable-rate products, particularly inappropriate given 
their fixed incomes. Others paid excessive amounts in fees and closing costs, stripping them 
of a great deal of their equity. 
Second, borrowers who did not seek advice often had concerns over issues of privacy. This 
was one of the major reasons borrowers cited when asked why did they not seek advice in 
general, and particularly why they did not seek advice from multiple people. Borrowers who 
expressed concerns about not wanting “people in my business” tended to rely more on their 
mortgage brokers and were more likely to have their mortgage broker or real estate agent be 
their only source of information about prevailing rates and their loan options. One woman, 
who adamantly proclaimed, “I’ve never been the type to consult people with my business,” 
admitted to making several mistakes and agreeing to terms that were much higher than she 
initially was told she qualified for. 
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Similarly, even if family or friends bestow “good” advice, borrowers may defer to the 
mortgage broker, whom they view as a professional or expert. For instance, one borrower 
who was concerned about people being “in her business” decided not to consult a cousin who 
was a real estate agent. Instead, she went with a real estate agent known to “put people into 
homes.” Concerns about her creditworthiness (despite reporting a FICO credit score of 672 at 
the time of application) led her to take the advice of her real estate agent, who told her that if 
she went with a mortgage company the process would be easier, and that given her credit 
score she would be more likely to be approved using a broker.  
When left to their own devices, borrowers may have a greater propensity to make less-than-
optimal decisions, particularly refinancers, whose only point of reference is their own pre-
vious experience. These borrowers admittedly made mistakes in subsequent mortgage 
transactions. As one woman commented, “I didn’t get any smarter the second time around.” 
This is consistent with evidence that subprime borrowers refinance into subprime loans rather 
than transitioning to prime rate loans (Courchane et al. 2004). 
4.7.3 Reasons Borrowers Obtain Financing 
A borrower’s motivation in seeking a mortgage matters because when short-term financial 
needs dictate an individual’s financial decision, he or she often loses out in the long run. 
Though contrary to credit counselors’ frequent comments, the borrowers whom I interviewed 
were not spendthrifts with ostentatious lifestyles. Borrowers’ pressing need for cash often 
resulted from the central caretaker roles they played in their families. One mortgage broker 
vividly described this type of borrower, who was responsible for: 
“Rescuing everybody in the family…You know, it’s my job to take care of 
Annie, Sue, Mama, Daddy, my sister’s kids, you know. You have people like 
that who make decent money but they’ve rescued everybody in the family and 
they have nothing left for themselves.” 
In interviewing solitary decision-makers, I found that several borrowers in this category 
refinanced with the sole intent of aiding family members, not because it was financially 
advantageous. For instance, one woman refinanced in order to pay her daughter’s wedding 
expenses. Ms. Ethel Hines, a solitary decision-maker, was an 81-year-old retired school 
cafeteria worker living on her social security income. She remarked that she will give more 
financially to her family than they will ever be able to give back. This sentiment was 
common among solitary decision-makers who had refinanced frequently. Several spoke of 
their home being a meeting place for family gatherings and temporary shelter for those in 
need. Sometimes they had taken in their children, grandchildren, or both. Even the youngest 
woman in this group was raising foster children. 
Borrowers’ pressing short-term financial needs in many instances made them more willing to 
accept a loan product that was more costly and/or more risky. Regardless of whether a bor-
rowers’ needs were pressing, they were not always aware of what they were agreeing to. 
Their overreliance on a mortgage broker who steered them into a higher-cost or unsustain-
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able product arguably was more of a determinant of their loan outcome than their pressing 
need. This was most vividly the case for borrowers who had taken out adjustable-rate loans, 
despite the fact that their incomes were fixed and they had no intention of ever moving. 
When borrowers were aware of having an adjustable-rate mortgage, they were often told that 
they would be able to refinance out of it before the fixed, teaser-rate period came to end. 
Whether borrowers had a pressing need or were steered into high-cost products by their 
mortgage brokers, those who did not make use of their social capital, or those whose social 
circles were limited to nonexperts, often paid a high cost when they made “bad” decisions 
about their loan options. 
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5.0 Future Research and Policy Implications 
This research provides a rare glimpse into the lives of borrowers and their experiences 
searching for and obtaining mortgage credit. In the future, a large-scale research project 
should be conducted to examine how the utilization of social capital varies for borrowers 
within and across different socioeconomic brackets, and also to what degree social capital is 
determinative of both choice of lender and choice of loan. Much of the research that attempts 
to explain racial differences relies solely on the financial characteristics of borrowers and at 
most uses basic demographic controls and/or examines the sociodemographic characteristics 
of neighborhoods. This paper illustrates that social mechanisms are at play in creating 
differences in borrower outcomes. Future research must then measure the effect of social 
capital and social networks on borrowers’ choice of lender and loan product on a larger scale 
in order to make generalizable conclusions. 
The policy implications of this research affirm the common-sense notion that borrowers 
make sound decisions when they have assistance. This is particularly true when obtaining 
mortgage financing is complicated by compensation schemes contingent on the borrowers’ 
lack of understanding of both the process and the products. The chips are stacked against the 
average American borrower, just as they were stacked against Mr. McAdams and the 
Cheathams.  
Policy makers must take a preventative stance by enacting policies that reduce the discrepan-
cies in information inherent in the transactional environment between borrower and industry 
actors. Costs must be made transparent and federally mandated disclosures apprehensible. If 
the market is to remain largely deregulated, these minimal actions should be considered 
obligatory.  
If the goal of public policy is to facilitate long-term and sustainable borrower outcomes, then 
third-party intermediaries play an essential role, particularly for borrowers who lack access to 
social resources or are susceptible to being targeted by exploitive or predatory lenders. Local 
government and nonprofit and community-based organizations play a important role in 
increasing awareness of the importance of seeking counsel from a third party and providing 
borrowers directly with both education and guidance. Many borrowers at present seek 
counseling just because down-payment assistance or first-time homeownership programs 
require it.  
Industry actors could also play an important role by creating a referral network that directs 
borrowers to social resources (e.g., credit counseling) that will facilitate improved outcomes. 
Prime lenders have stringent underwriting standards that exclude many potential home-
owners from accessing the lower-cost, prime sector of the market. This is particularly true of 
minorities. Even upper-income minorities are much more likely to be denied than their white 
counterparts. 
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Table 5.0. Denial Rates for Conventional Purchase Loans by Race-Income 
Combinations for the Atlanta Metro Area, 2005 
High-income Whites   8.4% 
High-income Blacks  28.7% 
High-income Native Americans  23% 
High-income Hispanics  20.5% 
High-income Asians  13.7% 
Where do these individuals turn when they have been denied? Do they give up the dream of 
homeownership, or pursue other, more costly options? By referring borrowers to nonprofit 
community-based groups, lenders demonstrate a commitment that they are working to ensure 
that borrowers get the information and guidance they need to qualify for loans at the best 
rates for which they qualify. 
Housing counseling has been proven to reduce the likeliness of borrowers entering into 
severe default. A Freddie Mac study found that borrowers were “19 percent less likely to fall 
behind on payments for three months or more at any time during the life of the loan than 
borrowers in comparable circumstances who were not counseled” (Hirad and Zorn 2001). 
Considering that 60 percent of subprime borrowers are marginal credit risks who fall in the 
“A minus” credit category, many subprime borrowers would benefit from credit counseling, 
enabling them to qualify for conventional loans at better rates (Morse 2001). Even borrowers 
whose credit scores would disqualify them for conventional financing could be directed to 
less risky products, such as FHA-insured loans. Housing counseling agencies play a critical 
role in informing borrowers of their options. However, the role of housing counseling 
agencies as third party intermediaries needs to be amplified. At present housing counseling 
agencies barely touch the tip of the iceberg.  
Community-based lenders also play a significant role in creating affordable mortgage 
products for borrowers who might otherwise turn to higher-cost loans. Such products could 
serve borrowers who may not qualify for traditional financing, but who do not represent the 
highest credit risks. It is arguable that many homeowners are steered into subprime products 
because it is more profitable for a lender to make a subprime loan than a prime loan. 
Community-based lenders can offer less risky and less costly alternatives for borrowers who 
have time constraints or those who are unwilling to go through longer, more intensive 
counseling to improve their creditworthiness.  
Table 5.1. One Lender’s Profit Margins Generated on Loans by Product Type 
Year Subprime Prime Difference 
2006 1.84% 1.07% 0.77% 
2005 2% 0.82% 1.18% 
2004 3.64% 0.93% 2.71% 
Source: New York Times, August 26, 2007. 
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6.0 Conclusion 
If left unabated, the problem of homebuyers receiving loans that are inappropriate given their 
financial circumstance and unaffordable over the long run will result in a continued rise in 
the rate of foreclosures. The problem is already astronomical, as “subprime foreclosures are 
expected to increase in 2007 and 2008 as 1.8 million hybrid ARMS — many of which were 
sold to borrowers who can not afford them — reset in a weakening housing market environ-
ment” (Schumer 2007). Researchers and practitioners must realize that for borrowers, choos-
ing a loan product is not solely based on economics; social factors greatly influence an 
individual’s choice. Borrowers make decisions based on the information they obtain through 
both formal and informal networks. Arguably, their loan outcomes are affected by not just 
whether they consult others but whom they consult. When borrowers have access to and 
utilize social resources, they learn from the experiences of others, are more able to distill 
complex information, and are more likely to be steered in the right direction. When given the 
right advice, potential homebuyers choose lenders and loans that are more favorable, improve 
their financial circumstances and are in better positions to sustain homeownership. 
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Appendix 
Sampling Methods Used with Public Deeds Records 
Homeowners residing in owner-occupied homes in the Atlanta metropolitan area who had 
purchased homes between January 1, 2004, and January 1, 2007, were targeted. The database 
of public deeds was searched using the name search feature. Borrowers were identified in 
accordance to lender. Both prime and subprime lenders, identified on lists of specialized 
lenders issued by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), were 
targeted. The names and addresses of individuals within the sampling frame were determined 
depending on the number of deeds associated with each lender, since several deeds had to be 
pulled before the name of a borrower in a selected census tract was identified. In order to get 
the addresses and names of borrowers, every deed had to be examined. Upon examination, 
additional information was collected. Public-deed records provide the amount of the loan and 
the lender. Sometimes they also information about the loan structure and terms and about the 
borrower’s marital status (and occasionally gender). Additional, there is a link to the fore-
closure deed, if one has been issued on the property. Using public-deed records, a sample of 
157 households was selected and subsequently sent recruitment materials. Of those mailings 
sent out, 27 were returned to the sender. Five homebuyers expressed interest in participating 
either by calling or returning the response card. Of these five, only three interviews were 
arranged and completed. 
There is a great deal of variability across census tracts in the Atlanta metropolitan area in 
terms of the share of all home purchase loans that are subprime, ranging from as high as 76.3 
percent of all home purchase loans being subprime to as low as 0 percent, with a median rate 
of 19 percent. Only households in census tracts in which the share of all loans that are sub-
prime is 25 percent or greater were sampled. Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) data 
was used to identify census tracts in which the total share of subprime home purchase loans 
is 25 percent or greater (slightly above the metropolitan mean level of 23.3 percent). 
Households were additionally targeted in accordance with the income and racial composition 
of the census tracts in which they reside. Additionally, homeowners currently experiencing 
foreclosure were targeted as well.  
Sample Stratification (for those recruited by mail) 
First, the eligible census tracts were sorted into six clusters based on their income and racial 
composition. The racial composition was measured in terms of the percent of the population 
classified as non-Hispanic black. Predominately black neighborhoods are neighborhoods in 
which 50 percent of more of the total population is black. 
Households with incomes less than 80 percent of the median family income (MFI) for owner-
occupied households were considered low income, but were not included in the sample in 
order to maximize the number of potentially creditworthy borrowers with subprime products. 
Households with 80 percent to 120 percent of the MFI were classified as middle income. 
Upper-income households were defined as households with incomes over 120 percent of the 
The Use of Social Capital in Borrower Decision-Making 
 
 February 2008 35 
MFI. In 2004 the MFI for owner-occupied households in the Atlanta statistical area (MSA) 
was $63,455.  
Income Level Categories Percent of Median  Family Income 
Median Family Income 
(metro Atlanta MFI: $63,455) 
Middle income 80–120 percent $50,764 to $76,146 
Upper income Greater than 120 percent < $76,146 
 
Within each of the six clusters, census tracts were arranged by location (by county). The 
listings obtained from the records of public deed, of individuals who purchased a loan from a 
subprime lender in the last two years, were sorted according to their census tract location 
(within the six clusters). This resulted in the loss of use of many of potential subjects. Due to 
time constraints, however, a more rigorous sampling method could not be employed.  
Data Collection 
Subjects were mailed a recruitment letter that informed them of the purpose of the research 
project and the criteria for participation. The letter included contact information (a phone 
number and e-mail address) that potential respondents could call to schedule an interview or 
notify the researcher of their interest in participating. Additionally, a self-addressed postcard 
was included that household members could mail in to express their willingness to participate 
and to disclose their contact information and availability. Subjects received a follow up post-
card requesting their participation in the study once again if no response had been received 
after a week.  
The interviews were open-ended and semistructured, utilizing an interview guide that 
included basic demographic questions, as well as questions about the mortgage product and 
mortgage-shopping behavior (e.g., the use of technology and/or social resources). Interviews 
were conducted in person and were recorded with the consent of the subject.  
Survey Instrument 
The survey instrument was formulated to obtain demographic data about respondents that is 
particularly relevant to their experiences searching for mortgage credit. It also obtained data 
to be used as controls. Additional questions measured the amount of effort borrowers 
expended in their search for mortgage credit, and their use of social capital in guiding their 
decisions. More specifically, borrowers were asked about the degree to which they consulted 
friends and family prior to and during their search for mortgage credit and whether the 
information they received was determinative of the loan product they ended up accepting. 
Respondents were asked the degree to which they relied on the mortgage broker to provide 
them with multiple financing options, and the extent to which they comparison-shopped and 
used technological resources. Borrowers were asked about obstacles that they faced and who, 
if anyone, helped them along the way to becoming a homeowner by providing advice. 
